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A woman, who is a United States citizen, lives abroad with her 
children and husband who is a foreign national. Her husband 
constantly beats her, strangles her, and verbally assaults her alone and 
in front of the children. Her husband has also started spanking the 
oldest child on a nightly basis. Because she is not familiar with the 
foreign legal system, she does not seek help or understand what she 
needs to do in order to get help. To protect herself and her children, 
she takes the children to the United States.  
Traditionally, under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects 
of International Child Abduction (hereinafter “Hague Convention” or 
“Convention”), enacted in 1980, (also referred to as the International 
Child Abduction Remedies Act, the name of the United States’ 
implementing statute) a court could return the children to the foreign 
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country if the husband petitions a federal court.1 While the Hague 
Convention does provide defenses to this remedy of returning the 
children to the country of the petitioning parent, these do not explicitly 
include a defense for cases of domestic violence.2 The most commonly 
used defense in cases of domestic violence is Article 13(b) that states 
the “remedy of return” is negated when there is a “grave risk of harm 
to child.”3 Although this defense would seem adequate to cover cases 
of domestic violence, the U.S. Courts of Appeals have traditionally 
either rejected it altogether or altered what the Hague Convention 
requires by interpreting it narrowly.4 In the past, circuit courts have 
given the grave risk of harm defense an extremely narrow 
interpretation.5 First, some circuit courts do not think that domestic 
violence between parents constitutes a grave risk of harm to the child.6 
Second, some circuit courts have reasoned that if the laws of the 
child’s country of habitual residence will adequately protect the child, 
courts should return the child, despite any domestic violence.7 Third, 
some courts have reasoned that courts should attach conditions, such 
as a restraining order, which will adequately protect the child when the 
court returns the child to the country of habitual residence, mitigating 
                                                 
1 See Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, 
Oct. 25, 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 11601 et al., 1343 U.N.T.S. 89 [hereinafter Hague 
Convention]; see also Nunez-Escudero v. Tice Menley, 58 F.3d 374, 377 (8th Cir. 
1995); Tabacchi v. Harrison, No. 99 C 4130, 2000 WL 190576, at *13 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 
10, 2000).  
2 Hague Convention, supra note 1, Article 13(b). 
3 Merle Weiner, International Child Abduction and the Escape From Domestic 
Violence, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 593, 651 (2000). [hereinafter Weiner I] 
4 See, e.g., Miller v. Miller, 240 F.3d 392, 402-03 (4th Cir. 2001); Blondin v. 
DuBois, 238 F.3d 153, 160-61 (2d Cir. 2001); March v. Levine, 249 F.3d 462, 472 
(6th Cir. 2001); Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060, 1069 (6th Cir. 1996); Nunez-
Escudero, 58 F.3d at 377. 
5 Jeremy D. Morley, Hague International Child Abduction Cases: The Future 
of the Grave Risk of Harm Defense, THE MATRIMONIAL STRATEGIST, February, 2007 
at 1. 
6 See, e.g., March, 249 F.3d at 472; Nunez-Escudero, 58 F.3d at 377; Tabacchi, 
2000 WL 190576, at *13. 
7 Miller, 240 F.3d at 402-03; Friedrich, 78 F.3d at 1069. 
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the grave risk of harm.8 Such conditions, or “undertakings,” are 
arrangements or conditions placed upon the parties that make it 
feasible to return the child to the country of habitual residence.9 
Undertakings typically include restraining orders, payments of housing 
and transportation costs, temporary custody arrangements, and other 
safety requests.10 Using this legal analysis, the circuit courts have 
narrowed the scope of the grave risk of harm defense, favoring to an 
impermissible degree the integrity of the Hague Convention over 
protection of individual children.11 Circuit courts have also violated 
notions of international comity by specifically undermining the laws 
of foreign countries when they evaluate the adequacy of those laws or 
issue undertakings.12 “International comity encompasses the idea that 
countries should interpret an international Convention that applies to 
both of them so as not to undermine the other country’s law and 
structure.”13 
In December 2005, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
recognized in Van de Sande v. Van de Sande that spousal abuse and 
child abuse constitute a grave risk of harm to the child.14 Despite the 
historically narrow interpretation of the grave risk of harm defense in 
the United States, Van de Sande represents the growing trend among 
some circuit courts to expand this defense.15 Specifically, the Seventh 
Circuit recognized that nowhere does the Hague Convention indicate 
that courts should analyze the laws of the country of the petitioning 
                                                 
8 See, e.g., Blondin, 238 F.3d at 163; Friedrich, 78 F.3d at 1069. 
9 Roxanne Hoegger, What If She Leaves? Domestic Violence Cases Under the 
Hague Convention and the Insufficiency of the Undertakings Remedy, 18 BERKELEY 
WOMEN’S L.J. 181, 188 (2003). 
10 Id. at 189. 
11 Morley, supra note 5, at 1. 
12 Danaipour v. McLarey, 286 F.3d 1, 23 (1st Cir. 2002); see Hoegger, supra 
note 9, at 202-03. 
13 Sharon C. Nelson, Turning Our Backs on the Children: Implications of 
Recent Decisions Regarding the Hague Convention on International Child 
Abduction, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 669, 689 (2001). 
14 See generally Van de Sande v. Van de Sande, 431 F.3d 567 (7th Cir. 2005). 
15 Morley, supra note 5, at 1. 
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parent to determine whether or not they provide adequate protection 
for children in cases of domestic violence.16 Also, the Seventh Circuit 
noted that undertakings might not be appropriate in cases of domestic 
violence.17  
This Comment contends that the Seventh Circuit correctly 
analyzed and expanded the grave risk of harm defense in the context 
of domestic violence. Section I will explain the provisions of the 
Hague Convention and International Child Abduction Remedies Act. 
Section II will discuss some of the problems with the remedy of return 
under Hague Convention in cases of domestic violence. Section III 
will address how several circuit courts have analyzed the grave risk of 
harm defense. Section IV will explain the Seventh Circuit’s decision 
in Van de Sande v. Van de Sande. Section V will further discuss why 
the Seventh Circuit correctly interpreted the Hague Convention and 
expanded the grave risk of harm defense in cases of domestic violence. 
 
I. THE INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION REMEDIES ACT 
 
The International Child Abduction Remedies Act is the United 
States statute which implements the international treaty entitled the 
Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child 
Abduction.18 The Convention on the Civil Aspects of International 
Child Abduction, done at The Hague on October 25, 1980, establishes 
legal rights and procedures for the prompt return of wrongfully 
removed or retained children, and secures the exercise of visitation 
rights.19 For example, the Hague Convention entitles a parent whose 
child has been abducted from a foreign country to the United States 
(typically by a parent) to petition in federal court for the return of the 
child.20 Specifically: 
 
                                                 
16 Van de Sande, 431 F.3d at 571. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 568. 
19 42 U.S.C. §11601(a)(4) (2002). 
20 Van De Sande, 431 F.3d at 568. 
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The Hague Convention was created to discourage 
abductions by parents who either lost, or would lose, a 
custody contest. . . The Convention drafters adopted a 
‘remedy of return’ . . . to discourage abductions, 
reconnect children with their primary caretakers, and 
locate each custody contest in the forum where most of 
the relevant evidence existed.21 
 
Framers of the Convention formulated it with the idea that 
custody issues should be decided by the country of the child’s habitual 
residence, not the country to which a parent has abducted the child.22 
Courts are to promptly return children, whose parent wrongfully 
removed or retained them within the meaning of the Convention, 
unless one of the narrow defenses under the Convention applies.23 
According to the remedy of return (also known as the ‘return 
principle’), the receiving country should promptly return the child to 
the country of habitual residence for adjudication of the custody 
matter.24 The remedy of return is the preferred response to 
international child abductions.25 Also, a Hague Convention proceeding 
is not meant to be used as a trial to determine custody, but instead to 
merely determine which country would have jurisdiction over any 
pending custody disputes.26 
Two defenses to the remedy of return are Articles 12 and 13(b), 
both of which must be established using clear and convincing 
evidence.27 Under Article 12 of the Convention, for example, a court 
need not return a child if one year has elapsed since the wrongful 
                                                 
21 Id. (citing Merle H. Weiner, Navigating the Road Between Uniformity and 
Progress: The Need for Purposive Analysis of the Hague Convention on the Civil 
Aspects of International Child Abduction, 33 COLUM. HUMAN RTS. L. REV. 275, 
278-79 (2002)) [hereinafter Weiner II]. 
22 Morley, supra note 5, at 1. 
23 42 U.S.C. §11601(a)(4). 
24 Hoegger, supra note 9, at 186. 
25 Id. 
26 Morley, supra note 5, at 2. 
27 42 U.S.C. §11603 (e)(2)(A) (2002). 
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removal or retention and the child is now settled in his or her new 
environment.28 In addition, a country is not required to return the child 
if the person seeking the child’s return “was not actually exercising the 
custody rights at the time of removal or retention, or had consented to 
or subsequently acquiesced in the removal or retention.”29 Article 
13(b) of the Convention states:  
 
Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding 
Article, the judicial or administrative authority of the 
requested State is not bound to order the return of the 
child if the person, institution, or other body which 
opposes its return establishes that (b) there is a grave 
risk of harm that his or her return would expose the 
child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise 
place the child in an intolerable situation.30  
 
II. HOW THE HAGUE CONVENTION FALLS SHORT  
IN DOMESTIC ABUSE CASES 
 
The structure of the Hague Convention and the preference for the 
principle of return have led to inadequate protections for victims of 
domestic violence.31 The Hague Convention provides no explicit 
defense that allows abduction if it occurs to escape from domestic 
violence.32 Further, courts have generally not interpreted the 
Convention’s current defenses (particularly the grave risk of harm 
defense) to prevent the remedy of return in the case of a mother’s 
flight from domestic violence.33 Also, the court of the country where 
the child is abducted to retains discretion to return the child to the 
                                                 
28 Weiner I, supra note 3, at 650. 
29 Id. 
30 Hague Convention, supra note 1, Art. 13(b). 
31 See generally Weiner I, supra note 3. 
32 Id. at 599. 
33 Id. at 651. 
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country of habitual residence, even when one of the defenses under the 
convention is asserted.34 
First, the Explanatory Report of the Convention, which courts are 
to give weight to when interpreting the Convention, asserts that 
defenses to the remedy of return, including the grave risk of harm 
defense, should be narrowly interpreted to prevent the “collapse of the 
entire structure of the convention.”35 Specifically, Paragraph 34 of the 
Explanatory Report states:  
 
[T]he three types of exception to the rule concerning 
the return of the child must be applied only so far as 
they go and no further . . . [A] systematic invocation of 
the said exceptions, substituting the forum chosen by 
the abductor for that of the child’s residence, would 
lead to the collapse of the whole structure of the 
Convention by depriving it of the spirit of mutual 
confidence which is its inspiration.36 
 
The U.S. Department of State, in a report prepared for the Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations, also confirms that courts should 
narrowly interpret the grave risk of harm defense.37 The report states, 
“any exceptions had to be drawn narrowly lest their application 
undermine the express purposes of the Convention—to affect the 
prompt return of abducted children.”38 The report also states, “it was 
generally believed that courts would understand and fulfill the 
objectives of the Convention by narrowly interpreting the 
                                                 
34 See Feders v. Evans-Feder, 63 F.3d 217, 226 (3d Cir. 1995); see also 
Antunez-Fernandes v. Connors-Fernandes, 259 F. Supp. 2d 800 (N.D. Iowa Civ. 
2003). 
35 Hague International Child Abduction Convention; Text and Legal Analysis, 
51 Fed. Reg. 10494 (Mar. 26, 1986); Morley, supra note 5, at 2. 
36 Hague International Child Abduction Convention; Text and Legal Analysis, 
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exceptions.”39 Finally, the State Department cautioned courts that the 
grave risk of harm defense “was not intended to be used by defendants 
as a vehicle to litigate (or relitigate) the child’s best interests.”40 
Second, the Convention itself seems to have a particular 
stereotype of the kinds of international kidnappings that occur.41 In 
particular, the drafters of the Hague Convention assumed that 
international child abduction almost always harmed to children.42 The 
drafters assumed that the abductors were non-custodial parents, 
sometimes abusive, who kidnapped the child because they thought 
they were going to lose custody.43 During the 1986 proceedings for the 
ratification of the Hague Convention in the United States, 
Congressmen told many real-life stories to illustrate the danger of 
international child abduction.44 All of the cases cited involved 
abductions by male non-custodial parents and a “deprived parent in the 
United States.”45 An identical stereotype also helped secure the 
passing of the International Child Abduction Remedies Act, the 
implementing legislation of the Hague Convention in the United 
States, in 1988.46 
While the remedy of return works well if the abductor is a non-
custodial parent, it is ineffective and inappropriate when the abductor 
is the primary caretaker who flees because of domestic violence.47 In 
such a case “the remedy of return puts the victim’s most precious 
possession, her child, in close proximity to her batterer either without 
                                                 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 Weiner I, supra note 3, at 603. 
42 Id. at 616. 
43 Id. at 617. 
44 Id. at 602. (Senator Dixon told the story of Patricia Rousch whose two 
daughters were kidnapped by their father, a Saudi national, even though she had 
legal custody of the children. Senator Gore spoke of Holly Planells, a woman whose 
son was taken by her ex-husband to Jordan, even though she had full legal custody 
and the judge had imposed restrictions on the father’s weekend visitation). 
45 Id. at 603. 
46 Id. 
47 Weiner II, supra note 21, at 278-79. 
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her protection (assuming she does not return with the child), or with 
her protection, thereby exposing her to further violence.”48 
 
III. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DECISIONS WITH REGARD TO 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE UNDER THE HAGUE CONVENTION 
 
While the United States Supreme Court has yet to decide a case 
on the implications of domestic violence under the International Child 
Abductions Remedies Act, the United States Court of Appeals have 
taken several different approaches to the issue.49 The circuit courts, 
until approximately 2000, traditionally followed the approach 
advocating courts narrowly interpret the grave risk of harm defense, 
often holding that domestic violence does not constitute a grave risk of 
harm.50 Specifically, some circuit courts have narrowed the grave risk 
of harm defense by requiring courts to evaluate the custody laws of the 
country of habitual residence and requiring courts to analyze whether 
undertakings can mitigate any grave risk of harm.51 Some circuits have 
also limited the grave risk of harm defense to a very narrow set of 
facts, such as circumstances in which the children suffer from post-
traumatic stress disorder.52 
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Nunez-Escudero v. Tice-
Menley, held that there was not a grave risk of harm to the child, 
although the mother alleged that she had been “physically, sexually 
and verbally abused” and that she was “treated as a prisoner” by her 
                                                 
48 Id. 
49 See, e.g., Blondin v. DuBois, 238 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 2001); Friedrich v. 
Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060 (6th Cir. 1996); Nunez-Escudero v. Tice-Menley, 58 F.3d 
374 (8th Cir. 1995). 
50 See, e.g., March v. Levine, 249 F.3d 462, 472 (6th Cir. 2001); Nunez-
Escudero, 58 F.3d at 377; Tabacchi v. Harrison, No. 99 C 4130, 2000 WL 190576, 
at *13 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 10, 2000). 
51 See, e.g., Blondin, 238 F.3d at 163; Miller v. Miller, 240 F.3d 392, 403 (4th 
Cir. 2001); Friedrich, 78 F.3d at 1069, Nunez-Escudero, 58 F.3d at 377-78; 
Tabacchi, 2000 WL 190576, at *15. 
52 See generally Blondin, 238 F.3d at 153. 
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husband and father-in-law.53 The mother (“Tice-Menley”) also stated 
that she feared for her baby’s safety because her husband and 
husband’s family objected to her nursing the baby, and the husband 
refused to buy a baby seat for the car.54 The court noted that most of 
the evidence presented concerned problems between Tice-Menley and 
her husband and father-in-law; thus, the evidence was not specific 
enough for the court to rule that there was a grave risk of harm to the 
child.55 The Eighth Circuit remanded the case to the district court in 
order to consider “information relating to the social background of the 
child,” specifically the environment in which the child would reside 
upon returning to his habitual residence.56 The court, however, 
instructed the district court not to “consider evidence relevant to the 
custody or the best interests of the child.”57 The court also noted that 
Tice-Menley must prove by clear and convincing evidence that return 
of the child to Mexico, the habitual residence, would subject him to a 
“grave risk of harm or otherwise place him in an intolerable 
situation.”58 
Ultimately, the Eighth Circuit seemed to reject the notion that 
domestic violence directed towards a spouse constitutes a grave risk of 
harm to the child; thus, the grave risk of harm defense would fail in 
situations of spousal abuse.59 The Eighth Circuit also espoused the 
notion that courts should look to the laws in the country of habitual 
residence and what social institutions are in place, if the court returns 
the child to his/her habitual residence.60 Accordingly, if a country has 
proper laws and social institutions in place, these laws and institutions 
                                                 
53 Nunez-Escudero, 58 F.3d 374 at 376. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 377. 
56 Id. at 378. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 377. 
60 Id. 
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mitigate the grave risk of harm to the child due to abuse of the mother 
or child.61 
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has noted that the grave risk of 
harm defense only exists in two very narrow circumstances.62 First, 
there is a grave risk of harm when return puts the child in imminent 
danger prior to the resolution of the custody dispute, such as returning 
the child to a “zone of war, famine, or disease.”63 Second, there is a 
grave risk of harm in cases of “serious abuse or neglect, or 
extraordinary emotional dependence, when the court in the country of 
habitual residence, for whatever reason, may be incapable or unwilling 
to give the child adequate protection.”64 The Sixth Circuit decided in 
the case of Friedrich v. Friedrich that there was not a grave risk of 
harm to the child because the mother’s only claim was that the child 
would have adjustment problems if returned to the habitual 
residence.65 The mother did not allege abuse on the part of her 
husband.66 Several circuit courts have commonly utilized the Sixth 
Circuit’s reasoning in Friedrich regarding what constitutes grave risk 
of harm to the child.67 Specifically, U.S. courts traditionally tended to 
look at the child protection and spousal protection laws of the country 
of habitual residence to determine if those laws provide adequate 
protection to the child, thereby negating any grave risk of harm.68  
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals actually held in the case of 
Blondin v. DuBois that there was a grave risk of harm to the child, but 
it seemed to limit its holding solely to the facts of the case at hand.69 In 
                                                 
61 Id. 
62 Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060, 1069 (6th Cir. 1996). 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 1067. 
66 Id. 
67 See, e.g., Blondin v. DuBois, 238 F.3d 153, 162-63 (2d Cir. 2001); Miller v. 
Miller, 240 F.3d 392, 403 (4th Cir. 2001); March v. Levine, 249 F.3d 462, 472 (6th 
Cir. 2001). 
68 See, e.g., Blondin, 238 F.3d at 162-63; Miller, 240 F.3d at 403; March, 249 
F.3d at 472. 
69 Blondin, 238 F.3d at 163. 
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Blondin, the father had repeatedly abused the wife and the children, so 
the wife took the two children from their habitual residence in France 
to the United States.70 When the father learned that the mother had 
taken the children, he instituted proceedings in the district court 
seeking return of the children to France under the Hague 
Convention.71 During the first proceeding in the district court, the 
mother prevailed on her grave risk of harm defense.72 However, the 
Second Circuit vacated the judgment of the district court and 
remanded the cause for further proceedings.73 The court did not 
question the trial court’s findings regarding the history of abuse, but 
held that further proceedings were required to determine whether “any 
arrangements might be made that would mitigate the risk of harm to 
the children, thereby enabling them safely to return to France.”74 On 
remand, the district court found that there was still a grave risk of 
harm to the children even though the father and French government 
had agreed to certain undertakings.75 Specifically, the father agreed to 
assist the mother and children financially in moving back to France 
and agreed not to make contact with them prior to the judicial 
determination on custodial rights, and the French government agreed 
that it would not prosecute the mother for abduction.76 Specifically, the 
district court found that any arrangements would fail to mitigate the 
grave risk of harm to the children because returning the children to 
France under any circumstances would cause them psychological 
harm, as France was the scene of their trauma.77 During trial, an 
uncontested expert testified that the children would suffer from post-
                                                 







77 Id. at 157. 
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traumatic stress disorder just from the act of returning to live in 
France.78 
Finally, the First Circuit Court of Appeals in 2000 recognized a 
grave risk of harm defense in cases of domestic violence.79 In Walsh v. 
Walsh, the court held that there was a valid grave risk of harm defense 
due to an abusive and violent husband; thus, the court would not return 
the children to Ireland.80 The circuit court reversed the decision of the 
district court because of several “fundamental errors.”81 First, the court 
reasoned that the district court “inappropriately discounted the grave 
risk of physical and psychological harm to children in cases of spousal 
abuse.”82 The circuit court also noted that the district court failed to 
take into account the husband’s “generalized pattern of violence,” 
(including violence that had been directed towards his children from a 
previous relationship) and the husband’s “chronic disobedience of 
court orders.”83 The court reasoned that spousal abuse causes physical 
and psychological harm to the children as recognized by social science 
literature, and state and federal law.84 The court also noted although 
Ireland had adequate protection laws, those laws would not prevent 
abuse because it was unlikely that the husband would follow them.85 
Finally, the court looked at the possibility of undertakings as a way to 
mitigate the grave risk of harm, yet reasoned that undertakings would 
also be ineffective because of the unlikelihood that the husband would 
adhere to them.86 
The court finally noted that they did not come to “this conclusion 
lightly.”87 The court recognized that international child abduction is a 
                                                 
78 Id. 
79 Walsh v. Walsh, 221 F.3d 204, 219 (1st Cir. 2000). 
80 Id. at 221. 
81 Id. at 219. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 220. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. at 221. 
87 Id. 
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serious problem and that in most cases Hague Convention petitions 
result in the return of the children to the country of habitual 
residence.88 However, the Hague Convention provides for certain 
“limited exceptions [defenses]” to the general principle of returning 
the child to the country of habitual residence and the court reasoned 
the Walsh case demonstrated such a defense.89 Specifically, the grave 
risk of harm defense applied to the Walsh case because of the 
husband’s flight after an indictment for threatening to kill another 
person and a long and documented history of violence and disregard of 
court orders, which, as the court stated, went “well beyond what one 
usually encounters even in bitter divorce and custody contexts.”90 
 
IV. SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S ANALYSIS IN VAN DE SANDE V. VAN DE SANDE 
 
 A. Introduction to Seventh Circuit’s decision 
 
The case of Van de Sande v. Van de Sande is a perfect example of 
when the remedy of return is inappropriate, and the Seventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals properly recognized this limitation within the 
International Child Abduction Remedies Act.91Also, the Seventh 
Circuit deviated from the reasoning of the Eighth and Sixth Circuits 
and is more willing to accept the notion that domestic violence 
constitutes a grave risk of harm to the child.92 Specifically, the Seventh 
Circuit rejected the jurisprudence courts should analyze the child 
protection laws of the habitual residence to determine if there is a 
grave risk of harm to child.93 The Seventh Circuit also questioned the 
remedy of undertakings, conditions placed on the alleged abusive 
                                                 
88 Id. at 222. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 See Van de Sande v. Van de Sande, 431 F.3d 567, 572 (7th Cir. 2005); 
Weiner II, supra note 21, at 278-79. 
92 See Van de Sande, 431 F.3d at 570; see also Blondin v. DuBois, 238 F.3d 
153, 153 (2d Cir. 2005); Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060, 1060 (6th Cir. 1996); 
Nunez-Escudero v. Tice-Menley, 58 F.3d 374, 374 (8th Cir. 1995). 
93 Van de Sande, 431 F.3d at 571. 
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parent that would still enable the court to return the child to the 
habitual residence despite a finding of grave risk of harm.94 The 
Seventh Circuit’s decision represents a shift in American jurisprudence 
under the Hague Convention whereby courts more broadly interpret 
the grave risk of harm defense.95 
 
B. The facts and district court decision 
 
Jennifer and Davy Van de Sande had two children, and were a 
married but estranged couple, and habitual residents of Belgium, 
Davy’s native country.96 A Belgian court awarded Davy custody of his 
two children through an ex parte decree.97 Jennifer, who was living 
with the children in the United States, refused to send them back to 
Belgium.98 Davy filed a lawsuit under the Hague Convention in order 
to have the two children returned to Belgium.99 Before the district 
court, Jennifer raised a grave risk of harm to the children defense.100 In 
support of this defense, Jennifer presented six affidavits, all claiming 
that Davy abused Jennifer and their older daughter.101 According to the 
affidavits, Davy began beating Jennifer in 1999.102 The beatings 
typically consisted of choking Jennifer, throwing her against a wall, 
and kicking her shins.103 The abuse occurred several times a week 
throughout the marriage, including when Jennifer was pregnant, and 
before and after their move to Belgium.104 Also, according to the 
affidavits, Davy’s mother joined in the beatings of her daughter-in-
                                                 
94 Id. at 571-72. 
95 Morley, supra note 5, at 1. 
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law.105 Jennifer complained to the Belgian police, but they said they 
could not do anything unless she went to a doctor to verify her 
injuries—which she did not do.106 Davy often beat Jennifer in the 
presence of the two children, causing them to cry.107 Davy also 
verbally abused Jennifer in the children’s presence, calling her a 
“cunt,” “whore,” “lazy fucking bitch,” and “lazy fat bitch.”108 Davy 
told the daughter “fuck mommy” and “Tell [sic] Mommy [sic] she’s a 
cunt.”109 
Davy also began physically abusing his daughter when she started 
wetting her bed.110 He would spank her, and he struck her in the side 
of her head on one occasion.111 Davy’s mother also struck the daughter 
in the head at least twice.112 In 2004, during a visit to Jennifer’s 
parents in the United States, Jennifer told Davy that she and the 
children would not be returning to Belgium.113 In response, Davy 
threatened to kill both her and the children.114 Jennifer told her father 
about Davy’s threats, the police were called, and an officer escorted 
Davy from Jennifer’s parents’ house.115 
Despite these affidavits, the district court granted summary 
judgment for Davy primarily on the ground that there was no 
indication that the Belgian legal system could not or would not protect 
the children.116 The court was also influenced by the fact that most of 
the physical and verbal abuse was directed at Jennifer, rather than the 
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children.117 Specifically, there was no accusations the Davy beat the 
younger boy, and the girl, although spanked and hit repeatedly, was 
not injured.118 Also, no expert evidence of the psychological effect of 
Davy’s conduct on either child was presented.119 The district court 
ordered the return of the children to Belgium.120 The only undertaking 
the judge inserted into the order was that Davy was to pay for their 
airfare to Belgium.121 The Seventh Circuit Court, however, reversed 
the district court’s decision and remanded the case for further 
hearings.122 
 
C. The Seventh Circuit’s decision 
 
In its decision, the Seventh Circuit explicitly recognized that the 
remedy of return under the Hague Convention is problematic in cases 
where the abductor is the primary caretaker and a victim of domestic 
violence.123 The court reasoned that, assuming the affidavits submitted 
by Jennifer were accurate (which the court must assume because Davy 
filed the Motion for Summary Judgment), Jennifer satisfied the 
statutory requirement that evidence of risk of harm to the children be 
clear and convincing.124 
The Seventh Circuit then rejected the district court’s analysis that 
the Hague Convention is just a venue statute, designed to deter parents 
from international forum shopping in custody cases.125 The Seventh 
Circuit also rejected the district court’s reasoning that courts should 
look to whether the child’s habitual residence has adequate child 
                                                 
117 Id. at 570. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. at 569. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. at 572. 
123 Id. at 569. 
124 Id. at 570. 
125 Id. 
17
Tier: Domestic Violence Harms the Child! The Seventh Circuit Puts Child
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2007
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                           Volume 2, Issue 2                       Spring 2007 
721 
protection laws.126 The court rejected this interpretation of the Hague 
Convention for several reasons.127 First, the court noted that there is a 
difference between “the law on the books and law as it is actually 
applied.”128 In particular, in domestic relations cases, abuse of children 
can often go undetected.129 The court argued that “to give a father 
custody of children who are at a great risk of harm from him, on the 
ground that they will be protected by the police of the father’s country, 
would be to act on an unrealistic premise.”130 Also, the court reasoned 
that nowhere in the Hague Convention or the language of the 
implementing statutes does it mention analyzing whether the laws of 
the petitioning parent’s country are good or whether such laws are 
zealously enforced; therefore, courts are going beyond the express 
language of the Convention.131 
Further, the court analyzed whether return with undertakings 
would be a more appropriate order.132 The court, however, had several 
concerns regarding the ordering of undertakings.133 First, the court was 
concerned that because the custody case was still pending in Belgium, 
the Belgian court would place the children in the care of a third party 
(or foster care) until the issue of custody was resolved by the Belgian 
courts.134 Instead of remaining in their mother’s custody in the United 
States, the Belgian court might place the children in a foster care 
institution, even though there was no suggestion that their mother was 
abusive, neglectful, or an otherwise unfit parent.135 The Seventh 
Circuit recognized that “return plus conditions (undertakings) could in 
many cases “properly accommodate the interest in the child’s welfare 
                                                 
126 Id. 






133 Id. at 571-72. 
134 Id. at 571. 
135 Id. 
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to the interests of the country of the child’s habitual residence.”136 
Further, courts and parents can more easily find evidence concerning a 
grave risk of harm in the country of habitual residence.137 The court 
also recognized that it may be more difficult and costly for the non-
abductor parent to prepare and present a court case in the country to 
which the abductor has fled.138 The court, however, did not seem 
persuaded by these arguments.139 The Court noted that in the case of 
child abuse, “the balance may shift against [the] return plus conditions 
[remedy].”140 According to the Seventh Circuit, the problem with 
extensive undertakings is that such a practice would embroil the court 
in the merits of the underlying custody issues—something the Hague 
Convention specifically states that courts should not do.141 Also, the 
court reasoned that undertakings are effective to preserve the status 
quo, but that is not the goal when there is evidence that the status quo 
is an abusive situation.142 
Finally, the court noted that while concern with comity among 
nations argues for narrow interpretation of the grave risk of harm 
defense, “the safety of children is paramount.”143 The court then 
ordered that the district court conduct an evidentiary hearing, since 
Jennifer had presented sufficient evidence of a grave risk of harm to 
her children.144 
 
                                                 
136 Id. at 571-72. 
137 Id. 
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V. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT EXPANDS  
THE GRAVE RISK OF HARM DEFENSE 
 
The Seventh Circuit has grasped what the Sixth and Eighth circuit 
courts have failed to—“while concern with comity among nations 
argues for narrow interpretation of the grave risk of harm defense . . . 
the safety of children is paramount.”145 Other circuit courts have 
created barriers to the grave risk of harm defense to the remedy of 
return in the case of domestic violence, while the Seventh Circuit is 
more willing to accept such a defense.146 Further, the Seventh Circuit 
recognizes the problems that have developed with regard to the 
remedy of return in cases of spousal abuse under the Hague 
Convention.147 Also, the court went further than other circuit courts in 
finding a valid grave risk of harm defense specifically by rejecting 
jurisprudence advocating courts analyze the laws of the country of 
habitual residence and issue undertakings to mitigate any grave risk of 
harm.148 The Seventh Circuit’s decision represents a general shift in 
Hague Convention jurisprudence by expanding the grave risk of harm 
defense to include cases of spousal abuse.149 The Seventh Circuit also 
preserved notions of international comity by rejecting the legal 
jurisprudence of courts analyzing of foreign country’s child protection 
laws and issuing undertakings.150 
By expanding the scope of the grave risk of harm defense, 
American courts may have to focus more on the child’s physical and 
psychological well-being in Hague Convention cases, which some 
                                                 
145 Id. (emphasis added). 
146 See, e.g., Blondin v. DuBois, 238 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 20005); Friedrich v. 
Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060 (6th Cir. 1996); Nunez-Escudero v. Tice-Menley, 58 F.3d 
374 (8th Cir. 1995); but see Van de Sande, 431 F.3d at 572. 
147 See generally Van de Sande, 431 F.3d 567. 
148 See generally id.; see also Blondin, 238 F.3d at 153; Friedrich, 78 F.3d at 
1060; Nunez-Escudero, 58 F.3d at 374. 
149 Morley, supra note 5, at 1. 
150 See Hoegger, supra note 9, at 202; see also Danaipour v. McLarey, 286 
F.3d 1, 25 (1st Cir. 2002). 
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circuit courts view as an impermissible custody evaluation.151 As one 
commentator noted, “[There is a] notion that the integrity of the 
Convention as a whole requires that the well-being of individual 
children in hard cases must be sacrificed for the greater good of 
maintaining the integrity of the Hague Convention process.”152 The 
Seventh Circuit has rejected that notion.153 
 
A. Spousal abuse constitutes a grave risk of harm to the child. 
 
First, the Seventh Circuit accepted the notion that spousal abuse 
harms the child.154 Unlike, the Eighth Circuit that rejected the notion 
that spousal abuse could lead to a grave risk of harm to the child, the 
Seventh Circuit accepted that although there may not be evidence that 
a spouse-abuser abused the children, there is still a grave risk of 
harm.155 Specifically, the Eighth Circuit seems to think that spouse-on-
spouse violence has no effect on the children, considering its holding 
that there was no grave risk of harm to the children when the father 
and father-in-law abused the mother.156 However, as the First Circuit 
noted “credible social science literature establishes that serial spousal 
abusers are also likely to be child abusers.”157 The First Circuit also 
noted that both state and federal law have recognized that children are 
at increased risk of physical and psychological injury then they are in 
                                                 
151 Hoegger, supra note 9, at 202.  
152 Id. 
153 See generally Van de Sande, 431 F.3d 567. 
154 Id. at 570. 
155 See generally Van de Sande, 431 F.3d 567; see also Nunez-Escudero v. 
Tice-Menley, 58 F.3d 374, 377 (8th Cir. 1995). 
156 See Nunez-Escudero, 58 F.3d at 377; see also, Tabacchi v. Harrison, No. 99 
C 4130, 2000 WL 190576, at *13 (N.D. Ill. Feb, 10, 2000) (where although the 
husband abused his wife there was no grave risk of harm to the child); March v. 
Levine, 249 F.3d 462, 472 (6th Cir. 2001) (where the court found that there was no 
grave risk of harm to the children although there was a default judgment in a 
wrongful death action against the husband after the disappearance of the wife 
because there was only a “tenuous inference” that he might hurt the children). 
157 Walsh v. Walsh, 221 F.3d 204, 220 (1st Cir. 2000). 
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contact with a spousal abuser.158 Specifically, in a congressional 
resolution passed in 1990, the House of Representatives found that: 
“Whereas the effects of physical abuse of a spouse on children include 
. . . the potential for future harm where contact with the batterer 
continues; whereas children often become targets of physical abuse 
themselves or are injured when they attempt to intervene on behalf of 
a parent.”159 The Seventh Circuit has agreed with the analysis of the 
First Circuit in Walsh; spousal abuse likely causes physical and 
psychological harm to the children.160 By recognizing that spousal 
abuse harms the child, the Seventh Circuit expanded the grave risk of 
harm defense.161 
 
B. Courts should not analyze the laws of foreign countries. 
 
The Seventh Circuit also rejected the legal jurisprudence 
instructing courts to look at the laws of the country of habitual 
residence and the enforcement of those laws to determine if there is a 
grave risk of harm to the child.162 The Sixth, Eighth, and Second 
Circuits have held that even in cases of spousal or child abuse, a valid 
grave risk of harm defense can be mitigated and the remedy of return 
still applied if the laws of the country of habitual residence are 
adequate to protect the child.163 The Seventh Circuit, however, 
extended the reasoning in Walsh that courts should not look to the 
                                                 
158 Id. 
159 H.R. CON. RES. 172, 101st Cong. (1990) (enacted). 
160 See Van de Sande, 431 F.3d at 570-71; see also Walsh, 221 F.3d at 220. 
161 See Van de Sande, 431 F.3d at 570-71; Morley, supra note 5, at 6-7. 
162 Van de Sande, 431 F.3d at 571. 
163 See, e.g., Blondin v. DuBois, 238 F.3d 153, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2001); 
Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060, 1069 (6th Cir. 1996); Nunez-Escudero v. Tice-
Menley, 58 F.3d 374, 377-78 (8th Cir. 1995); see also Miller v. Miller, 240 F.3d 
392, 403 (4th Cir. 2001) (where the court noted that it was confident that if the 
mother truly posed a danger to the children, the Ontario courts would adequately 
protect them); Tabacchi, 2000 WL 190576, at *15 (where the court noted that the 
mother failed to demonstrate that the Italian authorities would not adequately protect 
her and the child). 
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adequacy of the laws of the petitioning parent’s country.164 In Walsh, 
the court implied that it was irrelevant whether the laws of the 
petitioning parent’s country were adequate.165 The court specifically 
stated, “[w]e have no doubt that the Irish courts would issue 
appropriate protective orders. That is not the issue. The issue is John’s 
[the husband] history of violating orders issued by any court, Irish or 
American.”166 
The Seventh Circuit extended this reasoning to conclude that 
courts should not look to the adequacy of a foreign country’s laws.167 
The Seventh Circuit correctly noted that nowhere in the Hague 
Convention does it state that courts should analyze the laws of 
different countries to determine their adequacy.168 Further, just because 
a country may have adequate laws or even adequately enforce those 
laws does not mean that the grave risk of harm to the child will be 
mitigated.169 Most importantly, having United States courts evaluate 
the laws of other countries in Hague proceedings completely 
undermines the notion of comity, one of the primary goals of the 
Convention.170  
First, countries may have adequate law-on-the-books, but 
ineffective law enforcement or inadequate implementation of the 
laws.171 It is extremely difficult to measure to what extent law 
enforcement may or may not enforce particular laws or what common 
practices are in foreign countries.172 Also, because the abused spouse 
is not from the children’s country of habitual residence she may not be 
able to access the legal remedies available to her because she is 
                                                 
164 Van de Sande, 431 F.3d at 571; Walsh, 221 F.3d at 221. 
165 See Walsh, 221 F.3d at 221. 
166 Id. 
167 Van de Sande, 431 F.3d at 571. 
168 Id. 
169 Id. 
170 Hoegger, supra note 9, at 202. 
171 Weiner I, supra note 3, at 624-25. 
172 See id. 
23
Tier: Domestic Violence Harms the Child! The Seventh Circuit Puts Child
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2007
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                           Volume 2, Issue 2                       Spring 2007 
727 
unfamiliar with the foreign legal system or because she may not speak 
the language.173  
Second, although a country may have adequate laws that may be 
adequately enforced, it does not follow that an abusive parent or 
spouse will follow those laws.174 If a court finds there is a grave risk of 
harm, the harm cannot be mitigated even if a foreign country has 
adequate laws to protect the child or punish the abuser.175 Just because 
a parent may be adequately punished for domestic violence does not 
mean that the grave risk of harm to the child is mitigated, because if 
returned to the country of habitual residence a child will still be 
physically or psychologically harmed.176 The harm cannot be negated 
by adequate punishment after-the-fact.177 
Finally, when American courts conduct an analysis of another 
country’s laws or enforcement of those laws it goes against notions of 
international comity.178 Specifically, if an American court determines 
that there is grave risk of harm to the child after analyzing the habitual 
country’s child custody laws, the American courts are sending the 
message that the laws of the country of habitual residence are “bad.”179 
To preserve notions of international comity under the Hague 
Convention, courts should not pass judgment on the structure of 
foreign country’s family policy because to do so would undermine the 
laws of those countries.180 If courts ignore notions of comity, there is 
also a danger that courts will become “culturally imperialist.”181 For 
example, judges may send children and battered women back to 
countries that have similar cultural customs concerning the treatment 
                                                 
173 Id. at 625. 




178 Hoegger, supra note 9, at 202. 
179 Id. 
180 Id. 
181 Id. at 203. 
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of women and children, but refuse to implement the remedy of return 
when the country of habitual residence is culturally dissimilar.182 
The Seventh Circuit rejected the Sixth, Second, and Eighth 
circuits’ reasoning that in order to determine whether or not there is a 
grave risk of harm to the child courts need to look at the adequacy of 
the laws of the country of habitual residence.183 By rejecting the 
jurisprudence that courts should analyze a foreign country’s laws, the 
Seventh Circuit essentially expanded the grave risk of harm defense by 
removing an extra barrier to that defense.184 Previously, under 
American jurisprudence not only would an abductor parent have to 
prove a grave risk of harm to the child, but also that the child could not 
be adequately protected by the laws in the country of habitual 
residence.185 By eliminating this extra step, the Seventh Circuit has 
broadened the scope of the grave risk of harm defense.186 
 
C. Undertakings are inappropriate in cases of domestic violence. 
 
Unlike the Sixth and Second Circuit’s analysis, the Seventh 
Circuit reasoned that undertakings may not be appropriate in cases of 
domestic violence.187 The First Circuit also held that undertakings 
would not mitigate the grave risk of harm to the children in Walsh 
because there was no guarantee that the husband would adhere to 
them.188 The Seventh Circuit again agreed with the First Circuit and 
further explained, “in cases of child abuse the balance may shift 
against return plus conditions.”189 While some circuit courts seem to 
                                                 
182 Id. 
183 Van de Sande v. Van de Sande, 431 F.3d 567, 570 (7th Cir. 2005). 
184 See id.; see also Morley, supra note 5, at 1. 
185 See, e.g., Blondin v. DuBois, 238 F.3d 153, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2001); 
Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060, 1069 (6th Cir. 1996); Nunez-Escudero v. Tice-
Menley, 58 F.3d 374, 377-78 (8th Cir. 1995). 
186 See Morley, supra note 5, at 1. 
187 Van de Sande, 431 F.3d at 571-72; see also Danaipour v. McLarey, 286 
F.3d 1, 25 (1st Cir. 2002). 
188 Walsh v. Walsh, 221 F.3d 204, 221 (1st Cir. 2000). 
189 Van de Sande, 431 F.3d at 572. 
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accept undertakings as a valid remedy, the Convention does not state 
anything about undertakings or that they may be appropriate in order 
to effectuate a remedy of return.190 However, there is some argument 
that, although undertakings are absent in the Convention, they have 
become part of customary international law, as evidenced by the court 
rulings that apply them, thereby making them legally valid 
remedies.191 
Undertakings, however may be ineffective and have international 
enforcement problems.192 First, there is little evidence undertakings 
will deter spousal and child abusers.193 Studies on the dynamics of 
battering show that court orders have little deterrent effect.194 A court 
order or undertaking does not guarantee the safety of the victims for 
the same reasons that adequate laws do not – abusers do not always 
follow laws or court orders, and punishment after-the-fact does not 
negate the grave risk of harm to the children.195 In addition to 
problems in effectiveness, undertakings also have international 
enforcement problems.196 Once an abuser leaves the country that 
issued the undertakings, the undertakings will not be enforced unless 
the abuser travels to a country that specifically accepts them.197 
Because undertakings are not in the language of the Hague 
Convention, not every country recognizes them.198 Also, there is no 
central agency that is commissioned to monitor the enforcement of 
                                                 
190 See Hoegger, supra note 9, at 195-96; see also Danaipour, 286 F.3d at 21 
(“the concept of ‘undertakings’ is based neither in the Convention nor in the 
implementing legislation of any nation”). 
191 Hoegger, supra note 9, at 195. (Customary International law is a type of 
law with two characteristics 1) where it is practiced over time as evidenced by court 
rulings applying accepted treaties and legislations and 2) where there is evidence of 
opinio juris “the idea that such state practice is legally mandated). 
192 Id. at 196. 
193 Id. at 198. 
194 Id. 
195 Id. 
196 Id.; see Danaipour v. McLarey, 286 F.3d 1, 23 (1st Cir. 2002). 
197 Hoegger, supra note 9, at 198. 
198 Id. at 198-99; see Danaipour, 286 F.3d at 23. 
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undertakings or to monitor children altogether after they are returned 
to the country of habitual residence.199 Essentially, issuing 
undertakings and analyzing the adequacy of a foreign countries and 
laws are similarly problematic—neither ensure that a child will be 
protected before the child is abused.200  
Undertakings, like analyzing a foreign country’s laws, also 
undermine notions of international comity.201 By issuing undertakings, 
an American court will directly be telling another country how to 
structure its family law policy.202 Even more so than simply evaluating 
a foreign country’s laws, undertakings usurp the laws of the country of 
habitual residence by telling the country specific legal steps it needs to 
take upon return of the child.203 
The Seventh Circuit, in particular, seemed concerned with the fact 
that to adequately protect a child from potential abuse, courts would 
have to adopt extensive undertakings.204 The Seventh Circuit 
specifically noted that extensive undertakings would entangle the court 
in the merits of the underlying custody dispute, while the Hague 
Convention prohibits such an entanglement.205 Second, extensive 
undertakings would “dilute the force of the Article 13(b) exception.”206 
Allowing the remedy of return when there is a grave risk of harm 
defense, so long as there are adequate undertakings, goes against the 
intent of having defenses to the remedy of return.207 
By rejecting the notion that undertakings are appropriate in cases 
of domestic violence, the Seventh Circuit again expanded the grave 
                                                 
199 Hoegger, supra note 9, at 199. 
200 See id. at 198, see also Weiner I, supra note 3, at 679.  
201 See Daniapour, 286 F.3d at 23; Hoegger, supra note 9, at 202. 
202 Hoegger, supra note 9, at 202; see Danaipour, 286 F.3d at 25 (where the 
court reasoned that notions of International comity were violated where the district 
court issued undertakings with the expectation that the “Swedish court would simply 
copy and enforce them”). 
203 Hoegger, supra note 9, at 202; see Danaipour, 286 F.3d at 25. 
204 Van de Sande v. Van de Sande, 431 F.3d 567, 571-72 (7th Cir. 2005). 
205 Id. 
206 Id. 
207 See Hoegger, supra note 9, at 195. 
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risk of harm defense under the Hague Convention by eliminating 
another barrier.208 The Seventh Circuit also promoted the notion of 
preserving comity among countries, by suggesting that extensive 
undertakings are inappropriate because they undermine and usurp the 
laws of foreign countries.209 
 
D. The Second Circuit set the bar too high for 
 a grave risk of harm defense. 
  
While the Second Circuit in Blondin, did find that there was a 
valid grave risk of harm defense, the court’s ruling was too narrow.210 
Specifically, the court found that there was a grave risk of harm only 
because the children would suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder 
from merely returning to the country of France and the court limited 
its holding to the facts of the case at hand.211 The Second Circuit still 
held that it was valid to look at the adequacy of the child protection 
laws in the petitioning parent’s country and to look at the possibility of 
“extensive undertakings.”212 The Seventh Circuit’s holding in Van de 
Sande, on the other hand, properly recognizes that the grave risk of 
harm defense extends to many circumstances (including domestic 
violence), not just the narrow situation of post-traumatic stress 
disorder.213 
As the First Circuit noted in Walsh, the Hague Convention 
provides for defenses to the remedy of return.214 The Second Circuit, 
however, limited the defense to a unique fact pattern.215 Further, the 
                                                 
208 See Morley, supra note 5, at 7. 
209 See Hoegger, supra note 9, at 202; Danaipour, 286 F.3d at 25. 
210 See Hoegger, supra note 9, at 189; see also Weiner I, supra note 3, at 660-
61. 
211 Blondin v. DuBois, 238 F.3d 153, 162 (2d Cir. 2001). 
212 Id. at 163. 
213 Compare Van de Sande v. Van de Sande, 431 F.3d 567, 570 (7th Cir. 
2005), with Blondin, 238 F.3d at 163. 
214 Walsh v. Walsh, 221 F.3d 204, 222 (1st Cir. 2000). 
215 See Blondin, 238 F.3d at 163. 
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Second Circuit still considered possible undertakings.216 The Seventh 
Circuit takes a more reasonable approach to the grave risk of harm 
defense, instead of improperly limiting it to such a narrow set of 
circumstances.217 While the grave risk of harm defense is a limited 
defense, the Seventh Circuit correctly held that the limited defense 
includes cases of domestic violence.218 
 
E. Criticisms of expanding the grave risk of harm defense 
 
Some courts and scholars are concerned that by expanding the 
grave risk of harm defense, although benefiting individual children, 
may undermine some of the important policy considerations 
underlying the Hague Convention.219 For example, expanding the 
grave risk of harm defense will ultimately mean that a child’s physical 
and psychological well-being will be raised in Hague Convention 
proceedings.220 Courts are concerned that by analyzing a child’s 
physical and psychological welfare they will in effect be making a 
custody determination.221 However, a Hague Convention proceeding is 
not supposed to be used for the court to make any determination of 
future custody of the child—it is merely supposed to determine which 
country has jurisdiction to make the custody determination.222 Looking 
at whether there is a grave risk of harm to the child, however, does not 
necessarily mean that courts will be making a custody 
determination.223 The Convention specifically allows for the grave risk 
of harm defense; therefore, under the narrow circumstance of this 
                                                 
216 See id. 
217 See Van de Sande, 431 F.3d at 570; Hoegger, supra note 9, at 189; see also 
Weiner I, supra note 3, at 660-61. 
218 See Van de Sande, 431 F.3d at 570; Walsh, 221 F.3d at 220. 
219 See Morley, supra note 5, at 1. 
220 Id. at 1-2. 
221 Id. at 1-2. 
222 Id. at 1. 
223 See generally Weiner I, supra note 3. 
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defense courts must look to the well-being of the child.224 Thus, courts 
can and should look at the well-being of children within the context of 
this defense, which does not constitute a custody determination.225 
Some other concerns that courts have with expanding the grave 
risk of harm defense is that it may take more time to litigate Hague 
Convention proceedings and there is more possibility for abuses of the 
defense.226 First, if parents see that a grave risk of harm defense is 
successful in negating the remedy of return, they may raise it in all 
Hague Convention proceedings, regardless of whether domestic 
violence has actually occurred.227 Also, Hague Convention 
proceedings will be lengthened if courts are required to delve into 
facts regarding domestic violence and potential harm to the child.228 
While expediency is important in Hague Convention proceedings, 
ensuring children are not exposed to harm should outweigh concerns 
that proceedings will take more time.229  
Finally, courts are concerned that expanding the grave risk of 
harm defense will violate notions of international comity because it 
will appear as if American courts are making judgment calls about a 
foreign country’s ability to protect children in cases of domestic 
violence.230 If a court determines that there is a grave risk of harm to 
the child and refuses to return the child to the country of habitual 
residence, it still sends the message that the country of habitual 
residence has not and will not adequately protect the child.231 
Specifically the Explanatory Report on the Hague Convention noted 
that if the defenses to the Convention are regularly invoked, the entire 
                                                 
224 See Walsh v. Walsh, 221 F.3d 204, 221-22 (1st Cir. 2000). 
225 See generally Van de Sande v. Van de Sande, 431 F.3d 567 (7th Cir. 2005); 
see also Hoegger, supra note 9, at 187-88. 
226 See Weiner I, supra note 3, at 697-98. 
227 See id. 
228 See id. at 694. 
229 See id. at 698. 
230 See Van de Sande, 431 F.3d at 572. 
231 See Hague International Child Abduction Convention; Text and Legal 
Analysis, 51 Fed. Reg. 10494 (Mar. 26, 1986). 
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structure of the Convention would collapse because it would be 
deprived of the “spirit of mutual confidence.”232 However, courts 
violate notions of international comity more by analyzing a foreign 
country’s laws and by issuing extensive undertakings.233 When a court 
analyzes a foreign country’s laws it is directly critiquing those laws—a 
gross violation of international comity.234 Also, when a court issues 
undertakings it is directly usurping a foreign country’s laws, 
substituting its own judgment for that of the foreign country.235 These 
types of analysis violate comity more than merely looking at the harm 
to the child and denying the remedy of return.236 
Finally, expanding the grave risk of harm defense is arguably in 
direct contrast to the theory that courts are to narrowly interpret the 
defenses under the Hague Convention.237 According to the U.S. State 
Department the express purpose of the Convention is to return 
abducted children to the country of habitual residence, thus, any 
expansion of the grave risk of harm defense arguably undermines this 
purpose.238 However, the Convention explicitly allows courts to 
suspend the remedy of return in cases where there is a grave risk of 
harm to the child.239 Some circuit courts narrowed the defense so 
much that it would be nearly impossible to prove a grave risk of harm 
to the child (i.e. only in cases of “war, famine, or disease”).240 Also, 
circuit courts narrowed the defense by adding extra factors to prove a 
                                                 
232 Id. 
233 See Hoegger, supra note 9, at 202; see also Danaipour v. McLarey, 286 
F.3d 1, 25 (1st Cir. 2002) 
234 See Hoegger, supra note 9, at 202; see also Danaipour, 286 F.3d at 25. 
235 See Hoegger, supra note 9, at 202; see also Danaipour, 286 F.3d at 25. 
236 See Hoegger, supra note 9, at 202; see also Danaipour, 286 F.3d at 25. 
237 Feders v. Evans-Feder, 63 F.3d 217, 226 (where the court noted that 
“exceptions are to be narrowly drawn, lest their application undermines the express 
purposes of the Convention”). 
238 See id.; Hague International Child Abduction Convention; Text and Legal 
Analysis, 51 Fed. Reg. 10494 (Mar. 26, 1986). 
239 See Walsh v. Walsh, 221 F.3d 204, 221-22 (1st Cir. 2000). 
240 See, e.g., Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060, 1069 (6th Cir. 1996). 
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grave risk of harm that are absent in the Convention.241 Specifically, a 
parent would have to prove that the laws of the country of habitual 
residence were inadequate and that undertakings would be 
ineffective.242 By narrowing the defense to this extent, circuit courts 
went well beyond the express language of the Convention.243 In Van de 
Sande, the Seventh Circuit, although expanding the defense in 
American jurisprudence, recognizes the proper scope of the grave risk 




The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Van de Sande represents a 
growing trend in American jurisprudence to expand the grave risk of 
harm defense under the Hague Convention.245 Specifically, the 
Seventh Circuit has rejected the legal doctrines of courts evaluating 
the law of the country of habitual residence and issuing 
undertakings.246 By eliminating these types of legal analysis, abductor 
parents in Hague Convention proceedings only need to prove a grave 
risk of harm to the child, not the inadequacy of a foreign country’s 
laws or the inadequacy of undertakings.247 The Seventh Circuit has 
also made a grave risk of harm defense possible in cases of spousal 
abuse by recognizing that spousal abuse can harm a child 
psychologically and potentially physically because of the greater 
likelihood that a spousal abuser will also abuse the child.248 
                                                 
241 See Morley, supra note 5, at 1; see also Walsh, 221 F.3d at 218. 
242 See, e.g., Blondin v. DuBois, 238 F.3d 153, 163 (2d Cir. 2001); Friedrich, 
78 F.3d at 1069, Nunez-Escudero v. Tice-Menley, 58 F.3d 374, 377-78 (8th Cir. 
1995). 
243 See Van de Sande v. Van de Sande, 431 F.3d 567, 571 (7th Cir. 2005); see 
also Hoegger, supra note 9, at 195. 
244 See Morley, supra note 5, at 1; see also Walsh, 221 F.3d at 218. 
245 See Morley, supra note 5, at 1. 
246 Van de Sande, 431 F.3d at 571-72. 
247 See generally id. 
248 Id. at 570. 
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The Seventh Circuit has also properly preserved comity among 
nations in Hague proceedings.249 When courts analyze the laws of the 
country of habitual residence or issue undertakings, they are 
undermining a foreign country’s laws.250 One of the fundamental 
purposes of the Hague Convention is to prevent this; thus, the Seventh 
Circuit is promoting interests of international comity.251 
In the past, the circuit courts placed the policy considerations of 
narrowly interpreting the Hague Convention over the well-being of 
individual children by overly limiting the grave risk of harm defense 
through such barriers as evaluating the laws of the country of habitual 
residence and issuing undertakings.252 In Van de Sande the Seventh 
Circuit properly placed children first by restoring the grave risk of 
harm defense to its proper scope under the Hague Convention.253  
 
                                                 
249 See id. at 571-72; see also Hoegger, supra note 9, at 202. 
250 See Hoegger, supra note 9, at 202. 
251 Hague International Child Abduction Convention; Text and Legal Analysis, 
51 Fed. Reg. 10494 (Mar. 26, 1986); Hoegger, supra note 9, at 202. 
252 See Morley, supra note 5, at 1. 
253 See Van de Sande, 431 F.3d at 571-72; see also Morley, supra note 5, at 1. 
33
Tier: Domestic Violence Harms the Child! The Seventh Circuit Puts Child
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2007
